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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent. 
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 David Petko, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from the District 
Court’s orders granting summary judgment to the defendants on his retaliation and two 
due process claims.  For the reasons set forth below, we will summarily affirm. 
I. 
 In early 2009, authorities at the State Correctional Institute in Graterford, 
Pennsylvania, learned that then-inmate Petko wanted to kill the Clerk of the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania and two Northampton County prosecutors.  They also learned 
that Petko intended to sue one of the prosecutors.  In response, defendant William Radle 
placed Petko in administrative custody, confiscated Petko’s legal papers, and alerted the 
potential victims and outside law enforcement about the threats. 
 While still incarcerated, Petko filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action pro se, alleging 
that the defendants’ conduct throughout this period violated various constitutional rights.  
In an effort to find counsel for Petko, the District Court placed the case in suspense and 
referred it to a pro bono panel.  After consulting with Petko, panel member Gregg Kanter 
agreed to take the case and filed a three-count amended complaint.  Count one alleged 
that the defendants retaliated against Petko for seeking to sue the Northampton County 
District Attorney and for commencing this action.  Count two alleged that the defendants 
violated Petko’s due process rights by confiscating and retaining his legal papers without 
an opportunity to be heard and in a manner that violated grievance procedures.  Count 
three alleged that the defendants violated Petko’s due process rights by placing him in 
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administrative custody without an opportunity to be heard and in a manner that violated 
grievance procedures. 
 After discovery, the District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants 
on counts one and three.  The defendants then moved for summary judgment on count 
two.  At this point, Kanter and Petko reached an impasse.  The District Court allowed 
Kanter to withdraw as counsel, and Petko opposed summary judgment on count two pro 
se.  After considering Petko’s opposition, the District Court granted summary judgment 
to the defendants on count two.  Petko then timely appealed.1 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review of the District 
Court’s orders granting summary judgment is plenary.  See State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. 
Co. v. Pro Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 2009).  Summary judgment is 
appropriate if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there 
is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  We will summarily affirm the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment because this appeal does not present a substantial question.  See 3d 
Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
 The District Court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants on count 
one.  A prisoner alleging retaliation in violation of the First Amendment must show that  
                                              
1 Although Petko’s April 22, 2014 notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after the District Court’s March 20, 
2014 judgment, his notice was timely because the judgment was not set out in a separate document, and therefore he 
had an extra 150 days to file his notice of appeal.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a), (c); Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A); LeBoon 
v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 223-24 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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(1) he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken 
against him by prison officials sufficient to deter him from exercising his constitutional 
rights; and (3) there is a causal link between the exercise of his constitutional rights and 
the adverse action taken against him.  Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001).  
Even if the plaintiff proves these elements, “the prison officials may still prevail by 
proving that they would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for 
reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.”  Id. at 334.  The District 
Court found that the defendants’ reasons for their actions, all of which centered on the 
need to respond to and manage Petko’s alleged death threats, were related to legitimate 
penological interests.  The defendants’ reasons were grounded in the record and Petko 
failed to prove they were pretextual.  Therefore, the District Court did not err in granting 
summary judgment to the defendants on count one. 
 Nor did the District Court err in holding for the defendants on count two.  
Although prison officials deprived Petko of his legal papers, Petko received due process 
because he had access to and took advantage of an adequate post-deprivation remedy—
the Pennsylvania D.O.C.’s grievance procedure.  See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 
533 (1984); Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that prison 
officials that confiscated inmate legal materials did not violate the Due Process Clause in 
part because Pennsylvania D.O.C.’s grievance procedure provided adequate post-
deprivation remedy); Tillman v. Lebanon Cnty. Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 422 (3d Cir. 
2000) (holding that the “plaintiff had an adequate postdeprivation remedy in the 
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grievance program”).  Further, the evidence showed that the grievance procedures were 
followed.  Summary judgment for the defendants on count two was therefore appropriate. 
 As to count three, the District Court correctly held that the defendants did not 
violate Petko’s due process rights by placing him in administrative custody from 
February 20, 2009, to July 2, 2009.  Petko alleged that the defendants violated various 
D.O.C. policies, including the requirement that he be given a meaningful opportunity to 
be heard before extensive administrative custody.  But “a state statute or regulation 
conferring a right is not alone enough to trigger due process.  The state law must confer 
‘freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the 
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’”  Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 
703, 708 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)).  Petko 
offered no proof that the defendants violated such a state law or that his less than five 
months in administrative custody were otherwise atypical.  See id. at 708-09 & n.3 
(holding that 15 months in administrative custody in Pennsylvania prison without a 
hearing was not an atypical period of time).  Petko’s administrative custody did not 
violate due process. 
 Although not entirely clear, Petko seems to argue that the District Court erred 
because it appointed him counsel even though he was not proceeding in forma pauperis.  
Petko cites 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), which provides that courts “may request an attorney 
to represent any person unable to afford counsel.”  This argument has two flaws.  First, 
the District Court did not request counsel pursuant to § 1915(e); rather, it referred the 
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case to a special pro bono program.  Second, if Petko did not want counsel, he should 
have expressed this desire to the District Court and declined Kanter’s offer to represent 
him.  Petko took no such action.  To the contrary, he sent a letter to the District Court 
asking to consult with an attorney, accepted Kanter’s offer to represent him, and appears 
to have cooperated with Kanter until their irreconcilable disagreement about count two.  
To the extent Petko contends that Kanter provided ineffective assistance of counsel, that 
argument also fails because “[t]he remedy in a civil case, in which chosen counsel is 
negligent, is an action for malpractice,” not an appeal.  Kushner v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. 
Co., 620 F.2d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 1980) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Nelson 
v. Boeing Co., 446 F.3d 1118, 1119 (10th Cir. 2006) (“The general rule in civil cases is 
that the ineffective assistance of counsel is not a basis for appeal or retrial.”). 
III. 
 There being no substantial question presented on appeal, we will summarily 
affirm.  Petko’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied as moot. 
